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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relationship between the geopolitical rise of new powers in international 
relations and knowledge production in International Relations. It draws on the science studies 
literature on the “co-production” of science and politics to conceptualise and analyse this relationship 
between the ‘state of emergence’ and ‘state of knowledge’. I argue that the ‘state of emergence’ 
should not only be conceptualised as a real-world condition external to science that imposes itself on 
an otherwise pure internal ‘state of knowledge’, but also as a scholarly sensibility, ethos and 
motivation that operates ‘within’ it. The paper illustrates the argument ethnomethodologically by 
interviewing IR scholars in China and India on how they themselves make sense of the emerging 
condition and justify their own positions and actions within it. Based on the interviews, I identify four 
co-productive registers connecting the state of emergence to the state of knowledge (the constitutive, 
civic, infrastructural, and psychological) but also find that scholars in China and India differ in their 
enactment of these registers.  
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Introduction 
 
Decades of sociological inquiry into International Relations (IR) have characterised the discipline as 
“not so international” but “hegemonic” and dominated by the U.S. and “the West” (Wæver, 1998; 
Smith, 2000; Kristensen, 2015; Turton, 2015; Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al., 2016; Alejandro, 2018). 
The field is marked by asymmetric ignorance; a hegemonic but parochial Americo-Western core 
remains the primary exporter of ideas, particularly theories, while little travels from periphery to core 
(Tickner and Wæver, 2009; Tickner, 2013; Maliniak et al., 2018). Recent years have therefore 
witnessed intensified efforts to open spaces for “peripheral”, “Southern”, and “non-Western” 
scholarship in order to “decenter”, “provincialise”, and make IR more “global” (Nayak and Selbin, 
2010; Shilliam, 2010; Tickner and Blaney, 2012; Acharya, 2014, 2016; Deciancio, 2016; Turton and 
Freire, 2016; Aydinli and Biltekin, 2018).1 
At stake in debates on Western-centrism is not simply parochialism, ethnocentrism, and 
representation within the discipline, but the broader relationship between knowledge and power: how 
American-Western dominance in IR is entangled with, and constitutive of, American-Western 
dominance in world politics (Smith, 2000, 2002). Numerous studies have exposed early IR’s 
intertwinements with imperialism (Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004; Long and Schmidt, 2005; Vitalis, 																																																								
1 Although there is little evidence that IR is more American/Western-centric than other social sciences (Kristensen 
2015), this development is long-overdue and welcome. 
		 2 
2015) and how the “colonial household” of IR was erected on this Western- and Eurocentric historical 
foundation, by and for ‘the West’ to address its political concerns (Agathangelou and Ling, 2004; 
Acharya and Buzan, 2010; Hobson, 2012). During its alleged interwar ‘birth’, E.H. Carr (1939: 101) 
argued that international theories were not disinterested but “the product of dominant nations or 
groups of nations [and] have been designed to perpetuate their supremacy” and Stanley Hoffmann’s 
(1977) later characterised postwar IR as an “American Social Science” born to assist America’s rise 
to power. Recent interventions argue that Western IR serves as “handmaiden to Western power” by 
reflecting its interests, identities, perspectives, and policy agendas (Smith, 2004: 507–513, 2002), that 
its ideas are “weapons of U.S. foreign policy” (Oren, 2018) and continue their “role in sustaining 
Western supremacy” (van der Pijl, 2014: x). 
If IR “reflects U.S. political, economic and cultural hegemony” (Smith, 2002: 69) and “rode on 
the back of Western power” (Acharya and Buzan, 2010: 18), this raises a crucial but largely 
unexamined question: what happens if the political, economic, cultural, and military balance of power 
shifts away from ‘the West’? Will a post-Western world bring about a post-Western discipline, and, 
specifically on IR theory, will rising powers become theorising powers? There are indications in the 
literature on the “American social science” and IR ‘beyond the West’, reviewed below, that rising 
powers tend to become production sites for IR theories, but these studies more often assume than 
demonstrate the relationship between rising power and theorising. Meanwhile, the more theoretically 
and empirically attuned historiography and sociology of IR literature is predicated on a skeptical 
attitude towards such ‘externalist’ and ‘power political’ explanations of developments in IR theory 
and warns against drawing direct, especially causal, links between ‘external’ developments in world 
politics and theorising ‘inside’ IR. 
The ambition of this paper is to explore, theoretically and empirically, the relationship between 
the socio-political condition of ‘risingness’ and attempts to theorise in IR. What I henceforth call the 
state of emergence and state of knowledge. In the first, theoretical, section, I argue we need to reject 
the bifurcation between IR/i.r., inside/outside, internalism/externalism—in this case 
theorising/risingness—that guide the sociological and historiographical literature. Rather than 
looking for causal links between the ‘external’ political condition of risingness and the internal 
dynamics of science, I argue the state of emergence manifests itself ‘inside’ science as a sensibility 
scholars use to make sense of their own situatedness and justify their practices. Drawing on the 
science studies literature on the “co-production” of science and politics, I argue the state of emergence 
should be analysed in co-productive terms with the state of knowledge. Moreover, we need to 
examine comparatively and ethnomethodologically how scholars in different ‘rising powers’ enact 
the power/knowledge relation rather than assume or dismiss that a relationship between political 
events and theorisations exists. Rising powers do not produce knowledge, scholars do. 
Comparatively, this also implies that the state of emergence is no uniform condition, neither within 
nor between different rising powers. Scholars in rising powers embed and are embedded in the ‘state 
of emergence’ in different ways—namely in a constitutive, civic, infrastructural, and psychological 
register, and these registers are enacted differently by scholars in my two cases, China and India. The 
paper proceeds by presenting first theory and method, analysing each of the four registers, discussing 
the sources of comparative differences between the two cases, and finally concluding. 
 
Theorising the Relationship Between the State of Emergence and State of Knowledge 
 
The relationship between power and knowledge is a key theme in post-positivist and reflexive IR 
which interrogates, among other things, how dominant knowledges and dominant international 
political practices are co-constitutive of each other, how epistemic discourses not only describe but 
also constitute, reproduce, and legitimate world politics, and how the knowing subject is always 
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situated, its theories intrinsically normative, political and ideological and its perspective always a 
partial view from somewhere (for overviews, see Oren, 2018; Bueger, 2014; Allan, 2018). This paper 
contributes by studying the particular world-situatedness that is ‘risingness’ or ‘emergence’ and the 
equally particular power-knowledge link between the state of emergence and the state of knowledge. 
I do not claim ‘risingness’ is the only kind of situatedness for scholars in emerging powers, that rising 
powers are the only sites ‘beyond the West’ where new knowledge is produced nor that knowledge 
production is a new phenomenon in these countries. It is worth dedicating the paper to ‘risingness’ 
alone, however, because, apart from fragments in the literature, we have little knowledge about the 
role it plays as a driver of theoretical innovation. 
Early IR inquiries into the relationship between power and knowledge also emphasised how 
geopolitical ‘rise’ can shape knowledge production. Carr (1939) stressed the difference between the 
status quo perspectives of (declining) Anglo-Saxon ‘Haves’ and the anti-status quo perspectives of 
(rising) ‘Have-nots’ like Germany, Italy, and Japan. In Hoffmann’s (1977: 43) account, the political 
circumstance enabling the birth of IR as an American social science was “the rise of the United States 
to global power” and the need for intellectual underpinnings to American power projection. Robert 
Cox’s maxim that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” also emphasised how relative 
‘rise’ or ‘decline’ conditions theories: “the world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of 
nation or social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power, of a sense of 
immobility or of present crisis, of past experience, and of hopes and expectations for the future.” 
(Cox, 1981: 128).  
Studies of IR beyond Euro-America also contain indications that rising powers view the world 
differently and may become sites for theorising. Acharya and Buzan’s (2010: 2, 227-228) survey of 
‘Non-Western IR’ focused on Asia, the “only contemporary non-Western concentration of power and 
wealth”, and concluded that “great powers often produce theories of international relations”. Acharya 
(2011: 625) later asked “whether the development of distinctive schools of IR theories are the 
exclusive preserve of great powers, for example China, Japan, India and so on” and answered that 
this “would be hardly unusual given the historically close nexus between power (Britain, Europe and 
the USA) and the production of IR knowledge.” (also Mallavarapu, 2012: 22; Paul, 2017: 5). Tickner 
and Wæver’s (2009: 336) survey of IR ‘beyond the West’ found a dearth of theorising, except in 
China and emphasised its geopolitical rise as possible explanation: “a great power needs considerable 
paraphernalia, not least of which an independent IR school”. Later volumes confirmed that “we find 
efforts to create local schools of IR thought only in those countries that exercise substantial or rising 
international influence” (Tickner and Blaney, 2012: 8). The relationship between rising power and 
knowledge production is sometimes phrased in causal-functionalist terms: “rising powers seem to get 
the IR they need” (Bajpai cited in Mattoo, 2009b). Elsewhere, it merely reflects the expectation that 
rising powers are the most likely sites for counter-hegemonic IR, e.g. when Keohane (2009: 40) 
expects that “our implicit hegemonic assumptions will continue to hamper our vision until scholars 
from Brazil, India and China, and other emerging great powers become more prominent in the field.” 
The ‘theorising powers thesis’ covers various, loosely conceived, power-knowledge couplings 
between geopolitical risingness and theoretical developments in the discipline. Sociologists and 
historiographers of IR have long expressed scepticism towards such explanations, arguing that causal 
connections between ‘external’ political developments in world politics and ‘internal’ academic 
developments are vague, often assumed rather than demonstrated, and create “coherence and 
necessity” where there is heterogeneity (Wæver, 2007: 7, 1998; Schmidt, 1998, 2018). 
Historiographers largely reacted by delving into the micro, historical and ‘discursive-internalist’ (e.g. 
the first debate, Schmidt, 1998, 2018; Ashworth, 2002) while sociologists of IR proposed more 
nuanced externalist approaches to study how not only macro-political events but sociological 
variables like foreign policy, political culture, policy-academia links, institutional arrangements, and 
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disciplinary delineations affect internal theoretical conversations (Guzzini, 1998; Wæver, 1998; 
Breitenbauch and Wivel, 2004; Jørgensen and Knudsen, 2006; Grenier and Hagmann, 2016). The 
historiography and sociology of IR were both predicated on a critique of simplistic externalist 
accounts where the field of reality (international developments) determines theorising (IR). Rather 
than simply assuming direct links from power to knowledge, they argued, we need to study the 
development of ideas and theories in their academic, not only political, context, and to empirically 
document the causal influence of latter, if it exists at all (a strangely causal and positivist requirement 
considering both research programs emerged from reflexive or post-positivist IR). More 
problematically, internalist and externalist explanations both retain the premise that we can 
distinguish ontologically between science-internal and -external factors, both view the internal as the 
sphere where intellectual debates unfold and attribute sociality and politics mainly to the external, 
and disagree mainly over the relative priority given to external/social/contextual versus 
internal/scientific/anti-contextual explanations (Holden, 2002: 259; Wæver, 2007: 6; Breitenbauch, 
2013: 25–27). 
This epistemological and ontological starting point is out of sync with developments in science 
and technology studies (STS). STS has a longstanding interest in the relation between “most esoteric 
sciences and the most sordid politics” (Latour, 1993: 1). The theoretical starting point here is not to 
a priori distinguish between politics and science, external and internal, power and knowledge and 
then determine the interaction between them—or reunite them with a “mysterious slash”—but to trace 
the hybrid associations between them (Latour, 1999: 262; also Bueger and Gadinger, 2007: 105). STS 
analyses of the mutual entanglements of science and politics achieved their most developed 
conceptualisation in the “co-productionist” framework of Sheila Jasanoff and co-contributors in 
States of Knowledge (2004). The co-productionist framework rejects the dual reductionisms of 
science as simple reflection of truth and science as simply epiphenomenal of socio-political 
developments (Jasanoff, 2004: 3). Instead, Jasanoff directs attention to how scientific and political 
orderings “co-produce” each other; how knowledge is both a product of social work and constitutive 
of forms of social life. Scientific knowledge, she argues, “both embeds and is embedded in social 
practices, identities, norms, conventions, discourses, instruments and institutions – in short, in all the 
building blocks of what we term the social.” (Jasanoff, 2004: 2). 
By pointing to how science “embeds and is embedded in” the social, co-production stresses that 
science is never only a representation of the world ‘as it is’ but also as it should be. Scientific solutions 
to problems of social order are embedded in normative understandings of what are the right and 
relevant questions. Co-production is defined by “the proposition that the ways in which we know and 
represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to 
live in it.” (Jasanoff, 2004: 2, 38). This calls for an analytical symmetry that underscores both the 
situatedness of knowledge (scientific knowledge is produced by human beings with particular 
political motives and biases, situated in institutions and societies with certain norms, problems, and 
priorities) and that scientific knowledge co-produces social order (scientific knowledge is also 
involved in constituting, modifying, and legitimating state power). 
I use the co-productionist idiom to study whether and how ‘states of knowledge’ are also 
inseparable from ‘states of emergence’. The co-productionist move beyond internalism-externalism 
enables us to see that the ‘state of emergence’ is not an exclusively external condition causing changes 
in an otherwise pure internal knowledge production. The state of emergence is part of the context 
academics in ‘rising powers’ find themselves situated in, a collective sense of mobility, aspiration, 
and future importance that operates ‘within’ science as a sensibility, ethos and motivation for 
scholars. I examine co-productive associations between states of emergence and knowledge by 
studying how scholars working in ‘rising powers’ make sense of the emerging condition and justify 
their actions within it. This reflects the ethnomethodological preference in STS and pragmatic 
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sociology to “follow the actors”; i.e. the task of the analyst is not to limit actors to informers and 
teach them what is an acceptable explanation of their actions—which would afford an unreasonable 
degree of interpretive power to the analyst—but to grant them back the ability to make their own 
theories and follow them as they make new associations (Latour, 2007: 11–12; Boltanski and 
Thévenot, 2006: 12; also Bueger and Gadinger, 2014: 52). The point is not to make the “short-circuit 
fallacy” of drawing direct, unmediated links from the broader social universe to scientific practice 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 69), but to retain the ethnomethodological sensitivity to detect how 
actors themselves make mediated short-circuits between the worlds of politics and science (Latour, 
1999: 86–87). In this case, how scholars themselves make associations between the state of 
emergence and state of knowledge. By examining how scholars in emerging powers experience 
changes in the wider social universe, namely geopolitical risingness, and how these affect their 
knowledge production, we find that the state of emergence is not a uniform condition. IR scholarship 
in emerging powers embeds and is embedded in the ‘state of emergence’ in different ways (the four 
registers of co-production below). 
 
Method 
 
I therefore examine the relationship between the state of emergence and state of knowledge 
comparatively. A comparative design allows us to systematically compare IR in emerging powers 
and potential differences in how ‘risingness’ is experienced. I select China and India as cases for two 
reasons. First, in terms of the state of emergence, they are the largest, ‘most emerging’ of emerging 
powers. China and India have experienced sustained economic growth, trade and investment 
expansion, increasing political influence, and already rank among the five largest global economies, 
populations, labour forces, and military spenders (CIA, 2019; SIPRI, 2018). The state of emergence 
is not only an objective condition of economic-military growth or expanding foreign policy, however, 
but also a domestic state of aspiration and contestation over future identities in world politics (Miller, 
2016). In that regard, especially China but also India are obvious candidates. Second, in terms of the 
state of knowledge, existing studies suggest there are debates on how to develop ‘indigenous’ IR 
theories in both China and India. Chinese scholars ask if China’s rise will lead to the construction of 
Chinese IR theories (Qin, 2009: 195, 2011: 250, 2012: 50; Wang, 2009: 114) and debate how to 
construct a “Chinese school of IR” (Zhang and Chang, 2016; Kristensen and Nielsen, 2013; H.-J. 
Wang, 2013; Kim, 2016; Peng, 2018). Scholars have issued similar calls for India as a rising power 
to become an intellectual power, although the calls are more for “post-Western” than “Indian” 
theorising (Behera, 2007; Mattoo, 2012; Shahi, 2013; Shahi and Ascione, 2016; Vanaik, 2017). 
Within Chinese and Indian IR—broadly defined, including International Studies, the preferred 
term in India—I select interviewees based on a purposive sampling that aims for inclusivity and 
diversity in order to capture the heterogeneity of the fields. I include scholars from different vertical 
(rank, reputation, generation) and horisontal positions (cities, institutions, schools, paradigms). 
Institutionally, I include both universities and think tanks but, for feasibility reasons, focus on the 
main IR centers in Delhi, Calcutta, Beijing, and Shanghai. Interviews were conducted, in English, 
with 74 researchers from 2010 to 2014 (see appendix). The risk of systematic bias, e.g. self-selection 
due to language capabilities, is somewhat limited as there was a 76% response rate in China and 78% 
in India, of which only 4 Chinese and no Indian scholars declined. Interviews were semi-structured 
based on two clusters of questions relating to (1) the content of IR theory debates and (2) form, 
working conditions, institutions, and relationship to policymaking. Research for this paper 
specifically coded passages on the ‘rise’ and ‘emergence’ of China and India, and how it affects the 
content and form of IR theorising. My focus is on IR theory, rather than knowledge production in 
general, given its centrality in the literature above (and that on Western dominance). Interviewees 
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were promised anonymity and quotes, all from tape-recorded interviews, are identified only by 
country, city, institution type, and rank.  
 
The Constitutive Register: Emerging Powers, Objects, and Perspectives 
 
Co-production in the constitutive register concerns the constitution of epistemic objects. It refers to 
the “objectual practice” of rendering international phenomena knowable—by transforming them into 
thing-like objects—and thus governable (Cetina, 2016; Bueger, 2015; Allan, 2017). In this case, to 
associations between the growing global interests and systemic stakes of emerging powers and the 
expanding epistemic object(s) of their IR scholarship—e.g. the global economy, global trade, global 
climate, global order, global power transition—that require both knowledge and political action. 
These global epistemic objects are neither new nor the preserve of emerging powers, but the reasoning 
found in the interviews is that the state of emergence is conducive to universal ‘big thinking’ and 
theorising about the global order per se. Whereas smaller powers tend to focus on their own foreign 
policy, bilateral relations, and regional environment, rising powers with growing global interests, 
power, and influence will, even if they focus on their own foreign policy, inevitably have a more 
global epistemic object (cf. Hoffmann, 1977: 43, 48). Chinese interviewees operate in the objectual 
part of this register, to the point of reifying China’s rise. They variously designate this object as “the 
whole world”, “the globalised world”, “international society as a whole”, taking “a world vision, 
global vision” on the “international system and world order”, “a global perspective”, and “global 
knowledge with a global vision”.2 The contention is that rising powers should develop their own 
perspective on this epistemic object, i.e. “perceive the international order from the perspective of the 
Chinese”.3 While similar arguments are found in India—e.g. calls for “an Indian approach to various 
global concerns”—Indian interviewees operate in a more critical mode, critical of both India’s 
emergence and its impact on IR scholarship.4 
Chinese interviewees make strong associations between a more global orientation in foreign 
policy and a more systemic-global epistemic object in knowledge production; an object that must be 
analysed from a Chinese perspective: “Because China is becoming more preeminent today and have 
a lot of attraction from international society, I try to think about how China can engage with the world, 
how China behaves in the international system and I think we need to do this from a Chinese 
perspective”.5 Here, the new epistemic object remains China in the world, but others go further to 
advocate that China’s global emergence requires a “global perspective” comparable to U.S. scholars 
whose information about even “an unknown corner of the world…is why the Americans can now 
play a kind of prevailing role in the world.” For China to become a global power, the assertion goes, 
it must think globally. This, the interviewee continues, underscores “need of new theory or theoretical 
framework, we need such a kind of global perspective. And China is in a position to do that…it is 
possible for people to obtain such a kind of global perspective if you want to do that.”6 The state of 
knowledge needs to “catch up” with the state of emergence, another scholar asserts: “if China still 
grows then the theory research also has to catch up with the country’s development…So with your 
country integrating more into the world then you have to develop your own explanation about the 
																																																								
2 C2; C13; C9; C21; C4.  
3 C27. 
4 I37. 
5 C10. 
6 C21. 	
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relations”. Conversely, if “you want to develop a grand theory”, this scholar continues, you need to 
take a global-systemic perspective, “to stand on the global interest, to understand the whole world.”7  
Co-productive arguments in the constitutive register also take a form where rising geopolitical 
influence affords greater political action space, including a space to constitute, define, and provide 
Chinese visions for the world rather than accept the world as it is. Contrasted to the past when China 
was forced “to adopt all things Western”, a scholar argues its rise affords the “luxury of making your 
own choices” which requires China to be “inspiring and innovative enough that we want to be a new 
power in the world, providing some new positive things in the vision of the world order.”8 The 
constitutive argument that the state of emergence stimulates not only system-level thinking but the 
formation of distinctly Chinese perspectives on the global is also present in the literature on Chinese 
IR. The main proponent of a Chinese School argues China’s rapid development, expanding global 
interests, and increased “interaction with the rest of the world” has “encouraged the development and 
promotion of a Chinese school of IRT” (Qin, 2009: 195, also 2011: 250) because China needs to re-
negotiate its place in international society and “inevitably” must construct its own IR theory for that 
purpose (Qin, 2012: 50). The association between China’s position in the world and a more global, 
systemic, and theoretical, orientation in IR functions as an important motivation for scholars. 
However, co-productive associations in the constitutive register are not unidirectional—science 
simply catching up with a new epistemic object ‘out there’—but co-constitutive. Chinese scholars 
largely take China’s rise for granted and debate not whether China is rising or not, but whether it is 
rising or has risen (Breslin, 2017; Pu and Wang, 2018). By taking its rise for granted, indeed reifying 
it, Chinese scholars are complicit in constituting it as an epistemic object. They are not simply 
observing but co-producing the state of emergence. 
Comparatively, Indian interviewees are more sceptical of the ‘rising India’ narrative as held 
only by a small group of “scholars and policymakers who believe in India’s destiny as a great 
power”.9 Instead, India is variously termed a “middle power slash regional power” and “an emerging, 
reluctant power” that “wants to rise” and “is striving and aspiring to rise as an economic power”10 
(cf. Destradi, 2017). One even argues India “is not emerging, it is going down the drain. See what 
problems we got”.11 The state of emergence is thus more subdued, if not outright rejected, by Indian 
scholars. They are also more restrained concerning the impact of India’s alleged ‘rise’ on the state of 
knowledge, the object and outlook of Indian IR scholarship. Directly comparing to China, one 
interviewee claims “It hasn’t happened quite like that because the rise of India is not so marked as 
the rise of China in the global economy and in global politics.”12 Some Indian scholars do note, 
however, that the “rise of India as an emerging power” has opened a space for India to redefine the 
world, not only in strategy and policy, but also by uplifting the “status of IR theorising in India.” 
(Shahi, 2013: 56). As India’s foreign policy globalises, scholars need to think on a “world basis” one 
interviewee contends.13 In this sense, the state of emergence does function, for some, as a call to start 
thinking ‘big’ about international society. In sum, constitutive arguments based on the expansion of 
foreign policy scope may function as justification for developing systemic and global IR theory, but 
this co-productive link is stronger in China where most scholars take the state of emergence as fact 
and make various constitutive arguments about how this relates to the state of knowledge, whereas 
Indian scholars are more sceptical both of its rise and its supposed relationship to scholarship. 																																																								
7 C2. 
8 C3. 
9 I29. 
10 I15; I22. 
11 I20.  
12 I15. 
13 I22. 
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The Civic Register: Emerging Powers, Problems, and Obligations 
 
Co-production in the civic register revolves around notions of scholarly responsibility, societal and 
political relevance, and policy and public engagement (Tickner, 2006; Lawson, 2008; Jahn, 2017). 
Compared to the object-oriented constitutive register, the civic is problem-oriented. It connects 
science and politics via a pragmatic commitment to “real-world problem-solving” and the vocational 
impulse that knowledge-making must be of interest to non-academic audiences (Abraham and 
Abramson, 2017). In this case, the civic register connects the states of emergence and knowledge 
through a problem-solving ethos: IR scholars, as citizens in emerging powers, experience growing 
demand, and even obligation, to provide expertise that solves the problems facing emerging powers. 
The reasoning is that rising powers face specific ‘rising power problems’, which Western IR (theory) 
cannot solve. This requires ‘indigenous’ knowledge: “to find an Indian solution to Indian problems”, 
“to do more research on Chinese problems”, and answer “a specific question with Chinese 
characteristics”.14 The civic register contains two modes: the policy mode where the role conception 
is the advisor, the civic obligation is to serve the state, and the political function of scientific 
knowledge is to make better decisions versus the public mode where the role is the public intellectual, 
the civic obligation lies with civil society, and the function of knowledge is to enrich public discourse, 
‘speak truth to power’, and contribute to issues of public concern. The two overlap with distinctions 
between “state counsellors” and “partisans” (Mäkinen, 2017), “gap-bridgers” who advocate for policy 
relevance versus “gap-minders” who argue political relevance requires distance from policymaking 
(Jahn, 2017: 24) and “problem-solving” intellectuals who take the world for granted, aim to make it 
work more smoothly, and primarily serve the state and status quo versus “critical” intellectuals who 
stand apart from it, ask how it came about, and challenge it (Cox, 1981). In the policy mode, prevalent 
in China, the state of emergence materialises in a sense among scholars that politicians in emerging 
powers increasingly need their advice to solve obstacles on the path to great power status: to “help 
our government to deal with those new challenges” and “find solutions to the serious problems”.15 In 
India, more interviewees operate in the public mode where scholars have a civic duty to address the 
particular problems facing emerging societies—by critiquing, not necessarily advising, the state. 
In China, there is a strong sense that the state of emergence engenders growing public demand 
for IR expertise. Primarily from government, but also media and students. The demand-driven logic 
behind the civic register is exemplified by the argument that “When you are becoming a global player 
there is a huge demand on how the country can cope with this growing influence and how to find 
solutions to the serious problems…There is huge demand, the government is looking for solutions. 
And also there is a huge growing demand among the public about what is going on in the outside 
world.”16 Several scholars saw their role as “to satisfy the large Chinese demand of understanding 
the outside world [and] help the society understand the outside world better.”17 While some view the 
public as their audience, the modus remains problem-solving and policy-oriented. One scholar 
directly applauds how the government’s encourages scholars to “serve the needs of Chinese social, 
economic and political development”, “integrate our theoretical studies more effectively with the 
Chinese foreign practices”, and “provide the answers [to] help our government to deal with those new 
challenges.”18 It is a widely held perception that both media and government demand policy analysis, 																																																								
14 I24; C24; C10. 
15 C9; C3. 
16 C3. 
17 C1; C28. 
18 C9. 	
		 9 
area expertise, advice on pressing day-to-day issues, and, as another interviewee remarks, are “not so 
concerned with theory. They want answers to problems in the reality.”19 (cf. Avey and Desch, 2014: 
231–232). Here it is important to emphasise that power-knowledge is not a simple demand-supply 
relation. Statements in the civic register are not causal-functionalist axioms that new knowledge, 
including theories, will automatically emerge to satisfy an already-specified demand from 
policymakers, but rather appeals to the obligation of scholars to supply theoretical and intellectual 
visions that address our problems, provide strategic and foreign policy guidance, and worldviews. 
Whether policymakers in rising states really need indigenous IR theories to solve their problems or 
not, scholars sense a “need” and “obligation” to construct one: “as China’s role in the world is 
becoming more important and as China needs more, you know, we need more intellectual 
constructions to guide China’s foreign policy into this world”.20  
Driving the obligation to build “intellectual constructions”—notably Chinese IR theory—is the 
rationale that rising powers cannot rely on theories addressing the problems, political needs, 
economic situations, and strategic environments of status quo powers. Hegemonic stability theory is 
highlighted as a theory that “serves America’s interest” whereas “China has its own problems and the 
context may be different from other countries.”21  How to maintain leadership and institutional 
dominance ‘after hegemony’ is another “typical American” problem, “not a Chinese problem”.22 
Several interviewees argue Western theories can explain American and European “foreign policy and 
their viewpoints” but not “China’s situation, China’s behaviour” and therefore “the Chinese believe 
it is better to develop something that can resolve those problems for the Chinese, for themselves, a 
kind of new theory.”23 As one interviewee asserts, “[M]any theories cannot explain what happened 
in the last few years in China or in the world. Especially in the context of the rise of China. In this 
sense you need new theory and that is the point. There is a need for it. I will say that the Chinese 
scholars sense this.”24 How China can rise peacefully is a “question with Chinese characteristics” 
because “according to Western theories it is very difficult to rise peacefully”, another scholar 
contends, which also presents an intellectual opportunity because “these kinds of questions can be 
helpful for us to develop a school of Chinese IR theories”.25 Numerous interviewees single out “how 
to achieve the peaceful rise of China” as the crucial problem and theoretical “hard core” for a Chinese 
School (cf. Qin, 2007, 2011).26 “Chinese IR scholars should pay more attention to Chinese problems”, 
one interviewee argues, specifically “how China as a great power, as a rising power, peacefully 
engages in the international society” and “should keep in mind that we have an obligation or duty to 
create a Chinese IR school.”27  The civic justification for developing alternative theories about 
peaceful rise is not only that Western theories cannot explain the problems facing rising powers, but 
also to desecuritise China’s rise and educate sceptical Western audiences about China’s peaceful 
intentions. One scholar clearly explicates, “We have to build a theory to explain why China is a 
peaceful power when China becomes a great power…That issue needs a theory in order to understand 
it, to help you, Europeans and Americans to understand this issue.”28 The civic register thus has 
multiple audiences, not only governmental and domestic, but also civil society and international. 																																																								
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In India, civic arguments operate more in the public mode. There is a discernible sense of 
disconnect between academia and the state: “the Indian state doesn’t need its universities”, Indian IR 
scholars’ “involvement in policy is as close to nil as possible, tending toward zero” and has “less than 
zero impact” and the government neither demands nor supports theorising: “They need area studies 
experts…not typically a theoretician” and “they think that theories don’t help much”.29 Although the 
government “hardly bothers” about IR, a few interviewees suggest this may change “as India becomes 
more important” and that the demand for IR expertise “will probably rise in the years to come” 
because “India is emerging as an economic power and India’s involvement is growing more in parts 
of the world, so the Indian government needs more and more people.”30 Many Indian interviewees do 
not lament the disconnect, however, because the role of scholars in the public-critical mode is not to 
advise policymakers on how to solve problems, but to question the very constitution of political 
problems, reveal modes of domination, pose problems differently, and even “problematise the entire 
national project” as one interviewee proclaims (cf. Zambernardi, 2016: 13; Abraham and Abramson, 
2017: 31).31 In contrast to China where the Chinese School and the government’s strategy find a 
common ground for problem-oriented theorising on China’s (peaceful) rise, Indian scholars are more 
critical of deploying intellectual resources for the state’s emerging power project. Interviewees who 
advocate for theorising “voices of the South” cautiously stress it should avoid becoming a 
“nationalist” project and that “not all of it would agree with a rising India campaign. These are critical 
voices, not just critical of Western IR theory but critical also of, let’s say, India’s strategic behaviour 
today. It need not always jump onto the bandwagon of an emerging power.”32 Indian interviewees 
are generally more critical of the state and its “rising India campaign”. “Now that India is rising”, one 
interviewee laments, there is an attempt to couple academia to the rising state to support the narrative 
that “we are the Indians, we are going be a big shot country in the world and all the rest. We are so 
wonderful…this element of nationalism is undoubtedly there”.33 This critical deployment of the civic 
register—speaking truth to power—is rarer in China. 
When Indian scholars do deploy the civic register, the commitment is to enlightening the Indian 
public and civil society, not the higher echelons of government (cf. Abraham and Abramson, 2017: 
35). “[I]t is not that the government asks me to write all the time”, a think tank scholar argues, but “I 
feel this obligation that I have to make the society, this nation and this world a better place.” The 
attachment to society, how to improve it, make it secure and prosperous, he continues, “is what I 
mean by national obligation. It doesn’t have any, you know, hard approach or nationalist approach.”34 
Being nationalist, even government- and policy-oriented, is seen as more negative than in China. The 
problem of developing a national strategy of ‘rise’ therefore does not figure as prominently as the 
strategic problem to tackle among Indian scholars. There are, however, critiques of the inability of 
Western theories to explain the problems, histories, and realities of emerging societies in the South: 
“I do believe that not all the Western theories are well-equipped to illuminate the development in the 
Global South…for emerging societies like India, like China, like BRICS as you say, these are 
inadequate.”35 Indian interviewees also critique Western IR for having different definitions of “what 
is an interesting problem”, arguing that emerging countries “face problems which are not on the radar 
screen” in Western IR, and that Indian scholars should “offer answers to problematiques that are 
emerging elsewhere”.36 Compared to China, however, these critiques are not focused on Western IR 																																																								
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theories’ predictions about rising powers and unpeaceful power transitions but their unfitness in 
emerging Southern societies, and in this respect the audience differs too. 
 
Infrastructural Register: Emerging Resources, Institutions, and Disciplines 
 
Co-productive arguments in the infrastructural register take a more material-institutional path from 
state of emergence, featuring as a condition of economic growth and opening up to the world, to the 
state of knowledge by shaping organisational and disciplinary configurations. It refers to connections 
between politics and science, not knowledge, and works only indirectly via institution-building, 
growing research funding, and improved working conditions, which, in turn, afford greater autonomy, 
international connectivity, more resources and incentives for scholars to theorise (cf. institutional 
sociology of IR: Jørgensen and Knudsen, 2006; Grenier and Hagmann, 2016; Oren, 2016). In this 
register, Chinese scholars operate in an arriviste mode: China’s rise created a research infrastructure 
that allowed IR to emerge from stages of isolation, opening up, copying, and finally culminating in 
theory construction. Comparatively, Indian scholars operate more in a laggard mode: a general 
sentiment that India’s rise has not yet translated into a material-institutional IR infrastructure 
appropriate for a rising power. 
China has experienced immense growth in scholars, institutions, journals, funding and today 
boasts one of the world’s largest IR communities, second only to the U.S. (Qin, 2007: 316; Wang, 
2009: 107). The expansion of Chinese institutions and journals has created a career infrastructure, 
bypassing the Anglo-American core, where Chinese theoretical discourse can flourish (Kristensen 
and Nielsen, 2013). The experience of economic growth and material-institutional expansion was 
widespread in interviews.37 “Definitely IR is booming as a field, attracts a lot of people, a lot of 
students”, one Chinese professor remarks, “It is behaving like a growing power. You have extended 
your attention to every corner of the world and every aspect of international relations.”38 Although 
several interviewees emphasise that growth in funding is primarily directed to education while 
governmental research funding prioritises “policy issues” and “not theory”,39 improved material 
conditions increases the autonomy of the IR community to prioritise theoretical research. As “the 
Chinese economy grows, both the university and the Ministry of Education have much money”, one 
scholar notes, there is more support for theoretical research because “the Chinese IR community 
found out that the theoretical study is very important to the development of Chinese IR study in the 
future…So that is why we have to put more resources into theory studies in the future.”40 The growth 
of funding to research and higher education (“overall investment is much larger than before”) is seen 
to facilitate theorising through a growing division of labour and a diversification of research topics, 
including more theoretical and philosophical ones.41  
Infrastructural growth is coupled with an arriviste, almost teleological, narrative of disciplinary 
emergence. The history of Chinese IR is told as series of stages culminating in the rise of China and 
Chinese IR theory. IR under Mao is portrayed as institutionally weak, “very closed to the outside 
world”, not proper theoretical IR but “foreign policy study”, and ‘theory’ was dominated by Maoist-
Marxist orthodoxy.42 The main infrastructural juncture, in most accounts, was Deng Xiaoping’s 
‘Reform and Opening Up’, which broke from ideological dogmatism and encouraged international 																																																								
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connectivity, thus allowing a ‘new generation’ to travel to the West (the U.S.) and return as “the first 
scholars to introduce Western international theories to China.”43 During this “first stage”, “basic 
period” or “preparation stage”, American IR theories like realism, liberalism and later constructivism 
were introduced.44 Then followed a “second stage” of applying and critiquing Western theories while 
debating how to construct “IR with Chinese characteristics”. 45  These initial “stages” play an 
important role in the discourse on China’s disciplinary emergence by laying a “very important 
foundation for further theoretical development in China” and arriving at the “same level” where 
“there is not a big gap between the academic community inside China and the rest of the world”.46 
Finally, with China’s rise, Chinese IR arrives at the final “third stage” of theory construction and the 
“Chinese school”:47 “we have learned from the West, many things. Almost coming to some kind of 
final stage and then I think Chinese will become more Chinese in future.”48 The state of emergence 
features here as a communal sense of intellectual arrival for the Chinese IR community: “we have 
arrived at that stage”.49 The literature on Chinese IR expounds similar sentiments (Qin, 2007, 2011; 
Wang, 2009). 
In India, there is not a comparable arriviste-teleological narrative of disciplinary emergence. 
Even though International Studies has expanded institutionally and is by some estimates taught at 
more than 150 universities (Alagappa, 2009: 10), most interviewees express disenchantment that 
India’s rise has not translated into its IR infrastructure; that India is lagging behind from what is 
expected from a rising power: “IR studies in India itself is not, is considered as not up to that mark 
which still requires for an emerging power” and “There should have been several more institutions, 
which taught and thought about these questions, for a country of this size. I think it’s appalling.”50 
Interviewees lament that the IR infrastructure remains centred on Delhi, even Jawaharlal Nehru 
University (“tragic”, “inordinately loud”, “entirely negative”), and the “lack of interest in promoting 
institutionalised focused study of international relations across the country”.51 There is no sense that 
India’s emergence generates significantly more funding, but plenty complaints over the lack of 
funding for international travel, fieldwork, and, in some institutions, access to publications—the only 
silver lining being the freedom to “write on your own because anyway you have your salary”.52 
Several interviewees also lament the qualitative state of Indian universities (not “research 
universities”, “primarily teaching institutions”, “infamous for inefficiency”) and IR where you can 
“finger count” the people who do theoretical research (“we are operating in a sea of mediocrity”).53 
International Studies, as the field is called, is critiqued for being a-theoretical, conflated with area 
studies, and institutionally too broad.54 
Overall, there is significant disillusionment with the state of Indian IR and no comparable sense 
that it is entering a theory construction stage. Some do see hope for the future, however, because 
“India is realising that to keep itself as an emerging power or once it has emerged, it will need its own 
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base of ideas” and the government therefore is “working hard to upgrade universities.”55  One 
interviewee points to the establishment of new schools, partly a reflection of India being “an emerging 
country and therefore perhaps greater resources, both material and human resources, are being 
devoted to foreign policy, international relations, IR theory” as potentially laying the foundation for 
Indian IR theory: “ten years from now a far larger number of institutions and scholars working on IR 
theory. So ten years later maybe there would be an Indian school of IR theory. Not at this stage, not 
now.”56 Yet, even this (minority) view that India’s state of emergence may eventually translate into 
the state of knowledge through infrastructural expansion, continues to operate in a laggard mode (“not 
now”). Articles on Indian IR confirm the disenchantment and belatedness (Alagappa, 2009; Mattoo, 
2009a). 
 
The Psychological Register: Emerging Powers, Attention, and Confidence 
 
In the psychological register, the state of emergence affects the state of knowledge by enhancing the 
attention to, recognition, and confidence of IR scholars in emerging powers. The logic is that 
expectations of future power generate growing international attention to what emerging powers think. 
This growing attention is either motivated by the (Western) desire to understand their foreign policy 
and ‘how rising powers think’ (Callahan, 2008: 749; Geeraerts and Men, 2001: 251; Shahi and 
Ascione, 2016: 314; Mallavarapu, 2009: 166) or (Western) recognition of its own parochialism which 
creates a market for “other” voices (Tickner and Blaney, 2012: 5). Either way, the perceived effect is 
growing attention and recognition; a sense that the voice of emerging powers is heard and taken more 
seriously than that of smaller powers. This attention can both elicit a misrecognised and self-effacing 
stance where the lack of indigenous theory is deemed unworthy for countries of China and India’s 
power and civilisational stature or a self-assured and confident sense that the “time has come” (Ayres, 
2018) for scholars in emerging powers to show that “we can think” and “let the world hear the Chinese 
voice”.57 In both China and India, the state of emergence generates confidence, aspirations, and 
expectations among scholars that their country’s rising power should translate into innovative 
perspectives and eventually theorising, but also dissatisfaction that indigenous theories have not been 
produced or recognised yet. The two cases are more similar here, although Chinese interviewees 
operate more comfortably in a recognised and self-assured mode and Indian interviewees more 
towards the misrecognised and self-effacing mode with a more critical attitude towards this newfound 
attention. 
In China, it is a widespread sentiment that Chinese IR gets more attention due to an external 
desire to know more about the country, its foreign policy, and how rising powers think (“they want 
to understand what is going on in China”).58 A scholar outlines the sentiment when arguing that 
China’s “influence is increasing so very naturally people will pay more attention to China…So it 
seems you have more space to develop yourself if you work on something about China.”59  A 
discursive “space” is opening for scholars to speak on all things China, including Chinese IR theory. 
On the one hand, this boosts confidence: “the rise of China has strongly strengthened the self-
confidence of the Chinese scholars. This is a very important psychological moment.”60 The attempt 
to develop Chinese IR theory, another interviewee conjectures, “probably also has something to do 																																																								
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with the strengthening or upgrading of China’s international status” because it has generated a sense 
that its scholars, too, should “let the world hear the Chinese voice.”61 On the other hand, the Western 
gaze renders visible the “lack” of IR theory: “if you go abroad, Western scholars will ask me as you 
ask me why China does not have its own theories in the area of International Relations. Do we lack 
the ability to build a new theory? No…A great power needs its own theories, right?”62 In the 
encounter with ‘the West’, the lack of a recognised Chinese IR theory is deemed unworthy for a rising 
great power. “I went to America and also to the British I found that it is important that we say 
something”, another scholar recounted, “we should have ourselves some ideas, we should know 
China, we should have the Chinese school. So that way we can stand in the world…Otherwise we 
have no place in the world.”63 The psychological justification for developing new theories is that, as 
we have emerged, it is ‘unbefitting’ not to have our own theories.  
In India, the presumption that attention to IR scholarship is a function of the (perceived) power 
of the country in which scholars are based is also prevalent. One interviewee bluntly states, “you 
engage in the market of ideas depending on how your country is perceived and how your country is 
perceived is how politically important a position that country makes.”64 Relative rise, then, means 
relatively more attention, but also that emerging powers are taken more seriously and appear more 
persuasive. One interviewee even outlines a “power economy” theory in which you “cannot 
separate…IR theories and national power and economic capability”. He explains that “if a country is 
not economically strong, it cannot really that way make its views acceptable” as was the case with 
India in the 1970s whereas “Now, why we are talking about an Indian version of IR. Now India is an 
emerging economy…because of India’s economic clout, now India is being given some kind of 
importance…now India is taken very seriously.” 65  The argument is not that rising powers are 
suddenly producing innovative and different theories, but that they now receive long overdue 
attention and recognition. In the psychological register, India’s emergence is in a co-productive 
relation to the state of knowledge because it opens a discursive space to speak and be heard (“the 
world is interested”). This results in growing confidence, several interviewees note, to also think 
theoretically about the world: “I am heard…That feeling that some people are willing to lend their 
ear to you, that can boost confidence”, “most certainly Indians talk very confidently in seminars. They 
are also listened to much more. Earlier that was not the case. Western scholars for no good reason 
used to be condescending”, and “India is seen as an emerging power, so certainly it is good news for 
scholars also and they feel good about it” because “it gives you a sense of confidence and it also helps 
you in developing a vision for the world.”66  
Despite growing self-confidence, several Indian interviewees note that Indian IR remains 
misrecognised and entrapped in an inferiority complex. The problem, one notes, is that “we think that 
we don’t have any IR theory, we don’t have the capacity to think on the world basis…That is a 
psychological problem because we derived everything from the West, we talked in their terms, we 
talked in terms of their concepts.”67 This and several other interviewees uses the lack of independent 
concepts to assert that rising powers cannot simply imitate Western IR but should shed its inferiority 
complex. A rising India should develop its own “concepts, theories and categories”, one professor 
notes, “to build up your own understanding of things and not be lackey of some other forms of 																																																								
61 C9. 
62 C20. 
63 C6. 
64 I26. 
65 I31. 
66 I37; I19; I21. 
67 I22. 	
		 15 
thinking. Yes, for a rising power thinking on these lines in a sense is a must…There is no need to be 
unduly imitative.”68 It is unworthy for rising powers to “allow others to label you”, another argues, 
they have to demonstrate that they can think: “We just want to say that we can think.” India must do 
so, she continues, to become recognised and acknowledged: “India is emerging as a major power, so 
India needs to manufacture now, it cannot just borrow Western theories…If you are powerful, you 
have to build knowledge. And if you are building knowledge that has to be acknowledged, then only 
you are recognised as a power.”69  
The main difference from China is that some Indian interviewees take a more critical stance 
towards this growing attention and confidence. Even interviewees who are critical of the ‘rising 
power’ narrative agree that outsiders view India as rising and pay more attention: “people say ‘oh, 
your country has been doing well and it’s rising’. ‘OK, you think so?’ [laughing]…It’s how others 
look at you more than how you look at yourself sometimes.” However, this newfound attention space 
has certain discursive limits because the state of emergence creates a situation where only questions 
about India’s rise, foreign policy, power transitions, BRICs, and rising powers—what the same 
scholar calls a low hanging “fruit”—are “hurled at you” as “they” call upon you to speak even though 
this is not necessarily your field of expertise.70 Others note that Western IR still sets the agenda in 
this recently opened space; that invitations to international projects on “Asian rising powers” are 
“somebody else’s debate” and “somebody else’s agenda” in which you are interpellated as “an Indian 
IR scholar” expected to speak about and “for India” which “is an absurd sort of approach” that puts 
you in an “inferior position”.71  
 
Comparative Discussion 
 
As table 1 summarises, the constitutive register draws associations between a more global orientation 
in foreign policy and a more global, systemic, and theoretical orientation in knowledge production. 
Chinese interviewees operate in the objectual mode which takes China’s emergence for granted and 
make strong calls for taking the world, globe, and international order as epistemic objects while 
Indian scholars are more critical of their role in constituting India’s emergence, inclined to view 
‘India rising’ as elitist discourse, and sceptical about its impact on the state of knowledge. In the civic 																																																								
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Table 1. Four co-productive registers and their modes in China and India 
 
Registers China India 
Constitutive Objectual mode Critical mode 
Civic Policy mode Public mode 
Infrastructural Arriviste mode Laggard mode 
Psychological Self-assured mode Self-effacing mode 	
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register, Chinese interviewees express a strong sense that the state of emergence leads to growing 
demand for IR expertise and conceive the civic ethos in the policy mode as an obligation to help and 
advise the government solve Chinese problems, i.e. problems on its (peaceful) rise to great-
powerhood. Civic arguments are not weaker but take different forms in India where scholars are 
inclined to operate more in a public mode where their civic duty is to address the particular problems 
facing emerging societies by critiquing, not supporting and advising, the state. The contrast between 
Chinese and Indian states of emergence/knowledge is also discernable in the infrastructural register. 
There is near-consensus in China that IR has undergone an almost teleological maturation process, 
materially, institutionally, and intellectually, and now arrived at the theory construction stage, 
whereas the prevailing sense in India is that its IR infrastructure lags behind and does not live up to 
the expectations for an emerging power. In the psychological register, there is a strong sense in both 
China and India that expectations for their future power results in growing attention from the outside 
to what rising powers think and growing confidence among scholars that they should offer something 
different. Yet, China is further towards the self-assured and Indian more towards the self-effacing end 
of this register. 
Overall, Chinese IR embeds and is embedded in the state of emergence to a larger extent than 
Indian IR. Most Chinese scholars interviewed take the state of emergence as fact and make 
conjectures about how this affects the state of knowledge, whereas Indian scholars are sceptical about 
the state of emergence in the first place. One possible explanation is that China’s state of emergence 
is objectively ‘more advanced’. Its economy, trade, and military expenditures are around four times 
India’s, its foreign investment almost 9 times, and its official development assistance almost 25 times 
(AIDData, 2018; CIA, 2019; SIPRI, 2018; WTO, 2018). China has a larger global economic, political 
and military presence, which partly explains why Chinese scholars, in the constitutive register, are 
more concerned with ‘risingness’ and the global context. China’s expenditure in social science and 
humanities is around 4 times, and its personnel around 25 times, India’s (UNESCO, 2016: 305–316), 
which partly explains differences in the infrastructural register. However, these explanations 
implicitly suggest that China is simply temporally ‘ahead’. This has some truth to it, but I also argue 
that their states of emergence, and their relation to the state of knowledge, are different in kind, not 
simply degree.  
One main difference is that China’s emergence is securitised (China threat). This partly explains 
the desecuritising focus in the state of knowledge. The particular problem of peaceful rise in the civic 
register is a result of ‘China threat’ theories that posit China as the primary ‘non-Western’ challenger 
to American-Western hegemony. The civic duty of IR is therefore to counter pessimistic ‘Western’ 
theories about unpeaceful rise and tell ‘the West’ what China really wants. China’s state of emergence 
thus provides part of the explanation why Chinese scholars search for a (Sino-centric) national 
approach to IR theory, a Chinese School to explain China’s peaceful rise. India’s emergence is not 
securitised and theoretical efforts are therefore not framed around the need to counter Western ‘threat 
theories’. The political urgency to create a distinctly ‘Indian IR’ is weaker than during its non-aligned 
period or before its nuclear recognition (Mallavarapu, 2009: 169–171; Shahi, 2013: 51). Moreover, 
because Indian scholars are more sceptical of the rising India narrative and see a disconnect between 
academia and the state. India’s ‘rise’, the problem of developing a grand strategy for (peacefully) 
rising is seen as the state’s challenge, not a prominent academic problem. 
Their states of emergence also differ as to the role of ‘the West’, imperialism, humiliation, and 
nationalism. China and India share a collective trauma as world-historical civilisations humiliated by 
Western imperialism, which shapes their contemporary sense of entitlement. As the psychological 
register illustrated, it is a widespread sentiment in both countries that it is unworthy of a rising power 
with a long civilisational history and philosophical tradition not to have its own IR theory. But their 
colonial experiences were also different—India was colonised by the British for 200 years, China 
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was subject to piecemeal colonial rule by Western and Japanese empires (Miller, 2013). Coloniality 
also shapes the state of knowledge differently, in China’s case in a more nativist and in India’s a more 
postcolonial orientation. Many Chinese interviewees aim their critiques of Western IR theories at 
their pessimistic predictions concerning China’s rise, veiled attempts to prevent China’s rightful rise, 
and support the development of a Chinese theory for China, drawing on Chinese philosophy, culture, 
and historical experience. Chinese scholars write primarily for a national and policy-centric audience 
and secondarily for ‘the West to get China right’. Indian critiques are not focused so much on Western 
theories’ predictions about India’s rise, or rising powers generally, but on their unfitness to the Global 
South. Indian interviewees who advocate for ‘theorising from India’ (rather than ‘Indian theorising’) 
warn that such an endeavour should not apply only to India and solve only its problems—effectively 
allying with the Indian state and its rising project—but take the global South and postcolonial world 
as its audience. They critique the project of constructing a national theory, a distinctly non-Western 
‘Indian school’, as too nativist considering the plurality of India’s past, including its colonial past. 
The influence of postcolonial thought also makes many Indian interviewees more reflexive about the 
colonial experience, their relation to ‘the West’, and the possibility of recovering an innocently 
indigenous past. As one argues, “the West is within us”.72 Colonialism does not play a prominent role 
in the Chinese interviews. China’s past is seen as accessible, untainted by colonialism, and inherently 
Chinese. Sinocentrism and Chinese exceptionalism stands largely unquestioned (Zhang, 2013; Peng, 
2018)  
Other reasons why co-productive relations take different forms have to do with differences, not 
in their states of emergence, but in regime type, academic freedom, political and academic culture, 
and organisational context (cf. Breitenbauch and Wivel, 2004; Jørgensen and Knudsen, 2006). The 
Chinese political system is authoritarian and hierarchical. Its political and academic culture generally 
downplays disagreement and valorises harmony and loyalty. Whether or not China’s authoritarian 
political system actually needs policy-relevant knowledge from academics, it certainly does not 
encourage the dissent associated with the public-critical mode many Indian scholars operate in. Self-
censorship contributes to this. In terms of academic culture, the Chinese concept of theory, in line 
with Marxist-Maoist tradition, is arguably more pragmatic, policy- and action-oriented (Geeraerts 
and Men, 2001). Meanwhile, India’s democratic political system and culture valorises polyphony, 
pluralistic debate, and even cacophony among rival perspectives (Sen, 2006). Whether democracy 
and free social science research is a necessary condition for producing independent theories, except 
ideological ones, remains unclear, but it certainly seems a requirement for gaining global recognition 
as one (Buzan, 2018: 20–21). My focus in this paper has been on the relationship between the state 
of emergence and the state of knowledge, but the influence of ‘risingness’ fades once we zoom in on 
the specific domestic political, institutional, intellectual, and disciplinary setup. The two cases exhibit 
significant diversity here and further comparative research is needed to fully understand the potential 
shape of IR theories coming out of China and India. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper examined the relationship between the socio-political condition of ‘risingness’ (the state 
of emergence) and attempts to theorise (the state of knowledge)—a relation alluded to but rarely 
studied in the sociology of IR. Rather than analysing the political condition of risingness as a causal 
and ‘external’ factor that affects (or not) the otherwise pure and ‘internal’ dynamics of science, the 
paper demonstrated that the state of emergence manifests itself ‘inside’ science as a sensibility 
scholars use to make sense of their own situatedness. The associations scholars make between 																																																								
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knowledge and power, science and politics, risingness and theorising are neither internal nor external, 
neither purely scientific nor purely political, but co-productive. The paper identified four registers 
through which such co-productive associations between risingness and theorising are made. The 
associations made in the four registers in various ways show how the very assumption that rising 
powers will become theorising powers may turn it into a self-fulfilling prophecy. The ‘theorising 
powers thesis’ works through its reflexive effects.  
It works in the co-productive register because academics, particularly in China, subscribe to the 
idea that a more global orientation in foreign policy is conducive to more systemic and theoretical 
epistemic orientations in IR. In the civic register, regardless of whether the policymakers or civil 
societies of emerging powers really need indigenous systemic IR theories, the civic sensibility that 
scholars are obliged to construct new IR theories can itself function as an impetus for theorising. In 
the infrastructural register, the sense of material, institutional, and disciplinary arrival can itself 
provide momentum for the Chinese School project while excessive pessimism concerning the state 
of Indian IR has the opposite effect. Finally, arguments in the psychological register provide a clear 
illustration that the state of emergence affects theorising not only as an objective, external, and 
material condition but as an intersubjective sense of future importance. Here theorising efforts are 
justified both by the aspirations among scholars that their country’s rising power should translate into 
innovative perspectives—a sense that ‘our time has come’ to show that ‘we can think’ theoretically—
but also by way of misrecognition and an inferiority complex vis-à-vis ‘the West’. This sensibility 
itself provides an explanation why there are on-going efforts to construct IR theories in rising powers. 
It works because academics subscribe to the idea that rising powers should become theorising powers. 
The four registers also illustrate that the state of emergence far from determines the state of 
knowledge. By engaging scholars in conversations, we realise the state of emergence affects scholars 
quite differently. An externalist account drawing direct, unmediated links from risingness to 
theorising is ultimately misleading because two of the objectively ‘most rising’ powers differ 
significantly regarding the shape and strength of co-productive associations—particularly in the 
constitutive, civic, and infrastructural registers. These differences are only partly explained by the 
‘more advanced’ emergence of China, but are also products of their differing degrees of 
securitization, relationships to Western imperialism and indigenousness, academic cultures, socio-
political structures, and relationships to the state project. My comparative design inevitably stressed 
these differences between China and India, but it is important to stress that there are also similarities 
among the two and differences within each. Moreover, there are ‘interaction effects’ in that Indian 
disappointment with the state of IR is often benchmarked against China and arguments against a 
singular ‘national school’ often made in contrast to an authoritarian-nationalist China and its Chinese 
school project. The comparative dimension is important, however, because the kinds of theory 
potentially coming out of China and India are likely to differ depending on the degree to which they 
are connected to the state of emergence and how specifically they are translated through the four 
registers. Whether the result of these efforts will be recognised as ‘IR theory’ by the ‘global’ 
discipline is a question for further research.  
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